Abstract-We introduce an automated parameterized verification method for fault-tolerant distributed algorithms (FTDA). FTDAs are parameterized by both the number of processes and the assumed maximum number of Byzantine faulty processes. At the center of our technique is a parametric interval abstraction (PIA) where the interval boundaries are arithmetic expressions over parameters. Using PIA for both data abstraction and a new form of counter abstraction, we reduce the parameterized problem to finite-state model checking. We demonstrate the practical feasibility of our method by verifying several variants of the well-known distributed algorithm by Srikanth and Toueg. Our semi-decision procedures are complemented and motivated by an undecidability proof for FTDA verification which holds even in the absence of interprocess communication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to achieve parameterized automated verification of Byzantine FTDA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Parameterized Model Checking. In its original formulation [16] , Model Checking was concerned with efficient procedures for the evaluation of a temporal logic specification ϕ over a finite Kripke structure K, i.e., decision procedures for K |= ϕ. Since K can be extremely large, a multitude of logic-based algorithmic methods including symbolic verification [43] , [8] and predicate abstraction [32] were developed to make this decidable problem tractable for practical applications. Finite-state models are, however, not always an adequate modeling formalism for software and hardware:
(i) Infinite-state models. Many programs and algorithms are most naturally modeled by unbounded variables such as integers, lists, stacks etc. Modern model checkers are using predicate abstraction [32] in combination with SMT solvers to reduce an infinite-state model I to a finite state model h(I) that is amenable to finite state model checking. The construction of h assures soundness, i.e., for a given specification logic such as ACTL * , we can assure by construction that h(I) |= ϕ implies I |= ϕ. The major drawback of abstraction is incompleteness: if h(I) |= ϕ then it does in general not follow that I |= ϕ. (Note that ACTL * is not closed under negation.) Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [14] , [7] addresses this problem by an adaptive procedure, which analyzes the abstract counterexample for h(I) |= ϕ on h(I) to find a concrete counterexample or obtain Supported in part by the Austrian National Research Network S11403-N23 (RiSE) of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), and by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) grant PROSEED. a better abstraction h ′ (I). For abstraction to work in practice, it is crucial that the abstract domain from which h and h ′ are chosen is tailored to the problem class and possibly the specification. Abstraction thus is a semi-decision procedure whose usefulness has to be demonstrated by practical examples.
(ii) An orthogonal modeling and verification problem is parameterization: Many software and hardware artifacts are naturally represented by an infinite class of structures K = {K 1 , K 2 , . . . } rather than a single structure. Thus, the verification question is ∀iK i |= ϕ, where i is called the parameter.
In the most important examples of this class, the parameter i is standing for the number of replications of a concurrent component, e.g., the number of processes in a distributed algorithm, or the number of caches in a cache coherence protocol. It is easy to see that even in the absence of concurrency, parameterized model checking is undecidable [5] ; more interestingly, undecidability even holds for networks of constant size processes arranged in a ring with a single token for communication [51] , [26] . Although several approaches have been made to identify decidable classes for parameterized verification [26] , [24] , [54] , no decidable formalism has been found which covers a reasonably large class of interesting problems. The diversity of problem domains for parameterized verification and the difficulty of the problem gave rise to many approaches including regular model checking [2] and abstraction [45] , [15] -the method discussed in this paper. Again, the challenge in abstraction is to find an abstraction h(K) such that h(K) |= ϕ implies K i |= ϕ for all i.
Most previous research on parameterized model checking focused on concurrent systems with n+c processes where n is the parameter and c is a constant: n of the processes are identical copies; c processes represent the non-replicated part of the system, e.g., cache directories, shared memory, dispatcher processes etc. [31] , [35] , [44] , [15] . Most of the work on parameterized model checking considers only safety. Notable exceptions are [37] , [45] where several notions of fairness are considered in the context of abstraction to verify liveness.
Fault-tolerant Distributed Algorithms.
In this paper, we are addressing the problem of parameterized verification of faulttolerant distributed algorithms (FTDA). This work is part of an interdisciplinary effort by the authors to develop a tool basis for the automated verification, and, in the long run, deployment of FTDAs [36] , [38] . FTDAs constitute a core topic of the distributed algorithms community with a rich body of results [41] , [6] . FTDAs are more difficult than the standard setting of parameterized model checking because a certain number t of the n processes can be faulty. In the case of e.g. Byzantine faults, this means that the faulty processes can send messages in an unrestricted manner. Importantly, the upper bound t for the faulty processes is also a parameter, and is essentially a fraction of n. The relationship between t and n is given by a resilience condition, e.g., n > 3t. Thus, one has to reason about all systems with n − f non-faulty and f faulty processes, where f ≤ t and n > 3t.
From a more operational viewpoint, FTDAs typically consist of multiple processes that communicate by message passing over a completely connected communication graph. Since a sender can be faulty, a receiver cannot wait for a message from a specific sender process. Therefore, most FTDAs use counters to reason about their environment. If, for instance, a process receives a certain message m from more than t distinct processes, it can conclude that one of the senders is non-faulty. A large class of FTDAs expresses these counting arguments using threshold guards:
if received <m> from t+1 distinct processes then action(m);
Note that threshold guards generalize existential and universal guards [24] , i.e., rules that wait for messages from at least one or all processes, respectively. As can be seen from the above example, and as discussed in [36] , existential and universal guards are not sufficient to capture advanced FTDAs.
Contribution.
We consider parameterized verification of FTDAs with threshold guards and resilience conditions. We start by introducing a framework based on a new form of control flow automata that captures the semantics of threshold-guarded fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. Based on this framework, we show that the parameterized model checking problem under consideration is undecidable, even for FTDAs without interprocess communication and without arithmetic operations. Thus, we are led to propose a novel two-step abstraction technique. Both steps are based on parametric interval abstraction (PIA), a generalization of interval abstraction where the interval borders are parameters rather than constants. Using the PIA domain, we obtain a finite-state model checking problem in two steps:
Step 1: PIA data abstraction. We evaluate the threshold guards over the parametric intervals. Thus, we abstract away unbounded variables and parameters from the process code. We obtain a parameterized system where the replicated processes are finite-state and independent of the parameters.
Step 2: PIA counter abstraction. We use a new form of counter abstraction where the process counters are abstracted to PIA. As Step 1 guarantees that we need only finitely many counters, PIA counter abstraction yields a finite-state system.
It is interesting to note that the intermediate model obtained by Step 1 still falls in the undecidable class obtained above.
To evaluate the precision of our abstractions, we implemented our abstraction technique in a tool chain, and conducted experiments on several FTDAs. Our experiments showed the need for abstraction refinement to deal with spurious counterexamples [14] . We encountered spurious behaviors that are due to parameterized abstraction and fairness; this required novel refinement techniques, which we also discuss in this paper. In addition to refinement of PIA counter abstraction, which is automated in a loop using a model checker and an SMT solver, we are also exploiting simple user-provided invariant candidates to refine the abstraction similar to the CMP method [44] , [52] .
Thus, we are able to verify several variants of the well-known distributed broadcast algorithm by Srikanth and Toueg [48] , [49] in the Byzantine setting as well as the (simpler) algorithm verified by Fisman et al. [29] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to achieve parameterized automated verification of Byzantine FTDA. Related work. Traditionally, correctness of FTDAs was shown by handwritten proofs [41] , [6] , and, in some cases, by proof assistants [40] , [47] , [12] , [39] . Completely automated model checking or synthesis methods are usually not parameterized [53] , [50] , [9] . Our work stands in the tradition of parameterized model checking for protocols [10] , [31] , [25] , [45] , [15] , i.e., for mutual exclusion, cache coherence etc. In particular, the techniques by Pnueli et al. [45] , namely, counter abstraction and justice preservation are keystones of our work.
The first work that addresses parameterized model checking of FTDA uses regular model checking [3] , [2] , and was conducted by Fisman et al. [29] . They model a parameterized system consisting of n processes as a transducer, which translates a global state -modeled as a word of length ninto the next global state of the same length. Consequently, their models are limited to processes whose local state space and transition relation are finite, fixed, and independent of parameters, in particular, of n in their case. Such models were sufficient to verify a folklore reliable broadcast algorithm RBC (cf. e.g., [11] ) that tolerates crash faults, and where every process stores whether it has received at least one message. However, these models are not sufficient to capture more involved FTDAs that contain threshold guards as in our case.
Moreover, as [29] explain, the presence of a resilience condition such as n > 3t would require them to intersect the regular languages which describe sets of states with contextfree languages which enforce the resilience condition.
Our framework captures the RBC algorithm, and more advanced algorithms that use threshold guards over parameters and resilience conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first in which a distributed algorithm that tolerates Byzantine faults has been automatically verified for all system sizes and all admissible numbers of faulty processes.
Our technique applies to FTDAs, which are an important aspect of distributed systems, but by far not the only one. While there is other work in the verification and synthesis of distributed systems, they do not focus on algorithmic verification of safety and liveness properties for fault tolerant distributed algorithms. In this broader class of distributed systems literature, the work by Abdulla and Johnson [1] and Mayr [42] appears most closely related to ours because they address faults. However, their "lossy systems" contain very different fault assumptions, which are not part of the problem class we consider here.
Regarding our abstraction technique, an abstract domain similar to PIA was developed in [46] . It was used in the framework of abstract interpretation [18] , and was developed as a generalization of the polyhedra domain. Starting from a similar domain, [46] is thus taking a direction that is substantially different from parameterized model checking.
Let us conclude the introduction with a note on terminology: Fault-tolerant broadcast protocols are distributed algorithms which achieve reliable all-to-all communication on top of (partially) unreliable communication, or in the presence of processes that may send conflicting information to different processes. This notion of "broadcast" should not be confused with broadcast systems where the computational model contains broadcast primitives that ensure that processes can send information to all others, as e.g., in [28] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL WITH MULTIPLE PARAMETERS
We define the parameters, local variables of the processes, and shared variables referring to a single domain D that is totally ordered and has the operations addition and subtraction. In this paper we will assume that D = N 0 .
We start with some notation. Let Y be a finite set of variables ranging over D. We will denote by D |Y | , the set of all |Y |-tuples of variable values. In order to simplify notation, given s ∈ D |Y | , we use the expression s.y, to refer to the value of a variable y ∈ Y in vector s. For two vectors of variable values s and s ′ , by s = X s ′ we denote the fact that for all x ∈ X, s.x = s ′ .x holds.
Process. The set of variables V is {sv} ∪ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ Π: The variable sv is the status variable that ranges over a finite set SV of status values. The finite set Λ contains variables that range over the domain D. The variable sv and the variables from Λ are local variables. The finite set Γ contains the shared variables that range over D. The finite set Π is a set of parameter variables that range over D, and the resilience condition RC is a predicate over D |Π| . In our example, Π = {n, t, f }, and the resilience condition RC(n, t, f ) is n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t ∧ t > 0. Then, we denote the set of admissible parameters by P RC = {p ∈ D |Π| | RC(p)}. A process operates on states from the set
Each process starts its computation in an initial state from a set S 0 ⊆ S. A relation R ⊆ S × S defines transitions from one state to another, with the restriction that the values of parameters remain unchanged, i.e., for all (s, t) ∈ R, s = Π t. Then, a parameterized process skeleton is a tuple Sk = (S, S 0 , R). We get a process instance by fixing the parameter values p ∈ D |Π| : one can restrict the set of process states to S| p = {s ∈ S | s = Π p} as well as the set of transitions to R| p = R∩(S| p ×S| p ). Then, a process instance is a process skeleton
System Instances. For fixed admissible parameters p, a distributed system is modeled as an asynchronous parallel composition of identical processes Sk| p . The number of processes depends on the parameters. To formalize this, we define the size of a system (the number of processes) using a function N : P RC → N 0 , for instance, when modeling only correct processes explicitly, n − f for N (n, t, f ). Given p ∈ P RC , and a process skeleton Sk = (S, S 0 , R), a system instance is defined as an asynchronous parallel composition of N (p) process instances, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N (p)}, with standard interleaving semantics. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A system instance Inst(p, Sk) is a Kripke structure (S I , S 0 I , R I , AP, λ I ) where:
Informally, a global state σ is a Cartesian product of the state σ[i] of each process i, with identical values of parameters and shared variables at each process.
is the Cartesian product of initial states of individual processes.
• A transition (σ, σ ′ ) from a global state σ ∈ S I to a global state σ ′ ∈ S I belongs to R I iff there is an index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (p), such that:
The values of the local variables of the other processes are preserved: for every process index
• λ I : S I → 2 AP is a state labeling function.
Remark 1:
The set of global states S I and the transition relation R I are preserved under every transposition i ↔ j of process indices i and j in {1, . . . , N (p)}. That is, every system Inst(p, Sk) is fully symmetric by construction.
Remark 2: We call a pair of resilience condition and system size function (RC, N ) natural if {N (p) | RC(p)} is infinite. From now on we consider only families of system instances with natural (RC, N ), as this implies that there is no bound on the number of processes.
Atomic Propositions. We define the set of atomic proposition AP to be the disjoint union of AP SV and AP D . The set AP SV contains propositions that capture comparison against a given status value Z ∈ SV, i.e., [∀i. The labeling function λ I of a system instance Inst(p, Sk) maps a state σ to expressions p from AP as follows (the existential case is defined accordingly using disjunctions):
Temporal Logic. We specify properties using formulas of temporal logic LTL -X over AP SV . We use the standard definitions of paths and LTL -X semantics [13] . A formula of LTL -X is defined inductively as: (i) a literal p or ¬p, where p ∈ AP SV , or (ii) F ϕ, G ϕ, ϕ U ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ, where ϕ and ψ are LTL -X formulas.
Fairness. We are interested in verifying safety and liveness properties. The latter can be usually proven only in the presence of fairness constraints. As in [37] , [45] , we consider verification of safety and liveness in systems with justice fairness constraints. We define fair paths of a system instance Inst(p, Sk) using a set of justice constraints J ⊆ AP D . A path π of a system Inst(p, Sk) is J-fair iff for every p ∈ J there are infinitely many states σ in π with p ∈ λ I (σ). By Inst(p, Sk) |= J ϕ we denote that the formula ϕ holds on all J-fair paths of Inst(p, Sk).
Definition 3 (PMCP): Given a parameterized system description containing
• a resilience condition RC (generating a set of admissible parameters P RC ), • a system size function N , • justice requirements J, and an LTL -X formula ϕ, the parameterized model checking problem (PMCP) is to verify ∀p ∈ P RC . Inst(p, Sk) |= J ϕ.
III. THRESHOLD-GUARDED FAULT-TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS

A. Framework for FTDAs
We give a formalization that is adequate for thresholdguarded FTDAs, and suitable for verification. It captures threshold guards as discussed in Section I as a core primitive. FTDAs are usually described in steps that consist of a loopfree sequence of small steps.
Further, we model faults (e.g., Byzantine) that have the effect that correct processes receive more or less messages than actually should have been sent. We model the send operation by an increase of a global variable, and the receive by a non-deterministic choice that captures faults and asynchrony in communication. By this, we model the effect of faulty processes rather than modeling them explicitly. The soundness of the modeling approach requires involved arguments discussed in [36] . These arguments are in the area of distributed computing theory and out of scope of the current paper.
To address all these issues, we propose a variant of control flow automata. Henzinger et al. [33] introduced CFA as a framework to describe the control flow of a program, using a graph where the edges are labeled with instructions. Fig. 2 . CFA of FTDA from [29] (if x ′ is not assigned, then
Formally, a guarded control flow automaton (CFA) is an edge-labeled directed acyclic graph A = (Q, q I , q F , E) with a finite set Q of nodes called locations, an initial location q I ∈ Q, and a final location q F ∈ Q. A path from q I to q F is used to describe one step of a distributed algorithm. The edges have the form E ⊆ Q × guard × Q, where guard is defined as an expression of one of the following forms where a 0 , . . . , a |Π| ∈ Z, and Π = {p 1 , . . . , p |Π| }:
• if Z ∈ SV, then sv = Z and sv = Z are status guards;
• if x is a variable in D and ⊳ ∈ {≤, >}, then
is a threshold guard;
• if y, z 1 , . . . , z k are variables in D for k ≥ 1, and ⊳ ∈ {=, =, <, ≤, >, ≥}, and a 0 , . . . , a |Π| ∈ Z, then
is a comparison guard; • a conjunction g 1 ∧ g 2 of guards g 1 and g 2 is a guard. Status guards are used to capture the basic control flow. Threshold guards capture the core primitive of the FTDAs we consider. Finally, comparison guards are used to model send and receive operations.
Obtaining a Skeleton from a CFA. One step of a process skeleton is defined by a path from q I to q F in a CFA. Given SV, Λ, Γ, Π, RC, and a CFA A, we define the process skeleton Sk(A) = (S, S 0 , R) induced by A as follows: The set of variables used by the CFA is
Informally, a variable x corresponds to the value before a step and the variable x ′ to the value after the step. A path p from q I to q F of CFA induces a conjuction of all the guards along it. We call a mapping v from W to the values from the respective domains a valuation. We may write v |= p to denote that the valuation v satisfies the guards of the path p. We are now in the position to define the mapping between a CFA A and the transition relation of a process skeleton Sk(A): If there is a path p and a valuation v with v |= p, then v defines a single transition (s, t) of a process skeleton Sk(A), if for each variable x ∈ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv} it holds that s.x = v(x) and t.x = v(x ′ ) and for each parameter variable
Finally, to specify S 0 , all variables of the skeleton that range over D are initialized to 0, and sv ranging over SV takes an initial value from a fixed subset of SV.
Remark 4: It might seem restrictive that our guards do not contain, e.g., increment, assignments, non-deterministic choice from a range of values. However, all these statements can be translated in our form using the SSA transformation algorithm from [19] . For instance, Figure 1 has been obtained from a CFA (given in the appendix in Figure 4 ) that contains the mentioned statements.
Definition 5 (PMCP for CFA):
We define the Parameterized Model Checking Problem for CFA A by specializing Definition 3 to the parameterized process skeleton Sk(A).
B. Undecidability of PMCP for CFA
We call a CFA where all guards are status guards a noncommunicating CFA. In this section we argue that the problem from Definition 5 is undecidable even if the CFA is noncommunicating. 1 The outline of the proof is similar to the undecidability proofs in [31] , [26] : one of the processes plays the role of a control process that simulates the program of a two counter machine (2CM), and the other processes are data processes that each store at most one digit of one of the two counters encoded in unary representation. The control processes increments or decrements a counter by a handshake with a data process. In system instances that contain n data processes, this is sufficient to simulate n steps of a 2CM. If the parameterized model checking problem under consideration is defined for a natural (RC, N ), then for arbitrarily many steps there is some system instance that simulates at least that many steps of the 2CM. Undecidability of the parameterized model checking problem then follows from the undecidability of the non-halting problem for 2CMs.
Esparza [27] has shown that test for zero statements of a 2CM can be simulated with a temporal logic specification using an atomic proposition "test for zero". Given the proof strategies from [31] , [26] , the only technical difficulty that remains is to ensure a handshake between non-communicating CFAs. We do so by enforcing a handshake using sequences of status values the CFAs go through, and an LTL -X specification 1 The detailed construction and proof are given in Appendix A.
which acts as a scheduler that ensures a specific interleaving between the updates of the status variables of the two CFAs.
Theorem 6: Let M be a two counter machine, and (RC, N ) be a natural pair of resilience condition and system size function. One can efficiently construct a non-communicating CFA A(M) and an LTL -X property ϕ nonhalt (M) such that the following two statements are equivalent:
• M does not halt.
• ∀p ∈ P RC , Inst(p, Sk(A)) |= ∅ ϕ nonhalt (M). Corollary 7: PMCP for CFAs is undecidable even if CFAs contain status guards only.
As discussed in Section III-A, we model faults by the influence they have on values of variables in the domain D.
As we do not restrict the set of local and global variables, the result also applies if these sets are non-empty. Moreover, in this kind of modeling, the atomic propositions [∃i. sv i = Z] range over correct processes only. Hence, the undecidability result also holds for FTDAs. If one chooses to model faults differently, i.e., by changing the transition relation of a process, then the decidability depends on the way the transition relation is modified. For instance, certain problems are decidable in lossy systems [1] , [42] . However, lossy systems are not suitable for modeling the FTDAs we consider.
Notwithstanding this undecidability results, the rest of the paper is concerned with abstraction techniques for thresholdbased FTDA. In this context, Corollary 7 shows that the model checking problem we obtain after the first abstraction step (mentioned in the introduction) is still undecidable. As discussed in the introduction, abstraction always has to be accompanied by a case study along with practical experiments.
C. Case Study
The distributed algorithm by Srikanth and Toueg [48] , [49] is one of the most basic distributed algorithms that has applications in a wide area of distributed computing. It is a basic building block that has been used in various environments (degrees of synchrony, fault assumptions, etc.) and many other more complicated distributed algorithms, such as consensus [23] , [4] , software and hardware clock synchronization [48] , [30] , approximate agreement [22] , and k-set agreement [21] . Figure 1 shows the guarded control flow automaton of the core of Srikanth and Toueg's algorithm.
In our experiments we consider additional three algorithms that are based on similar algorithmic ideas. 2 They deal with different fault models and resilience conditions; the algorithms are: (BYZ), which is the algorithm from Figure 1 , for t Byzantine faults if n > 3t, (SYMM) for t symmetric (identical Byzantine [6] ) faults if n > 2t, (OMIT) for t send omission faults if n > 2t, and (CLEAN) for t clean crash faults if n > t. For comparison with the results by Fisman et al. [29] , we also verified the RBC algorithm whose CFA is given in Figure 2 . In this paper we verify the following safety and liveness specifications for the algorithms:
However, from the literature we know that we cannot expect to verify these FTDAs without putting additional constraints on the environment, e.g., communication fairness, i.e., every message sent is eventually received. To capture this, we use justice requirements, e.g., J = {[∀i. rcvd i ≥ nsnt]} in the Byzantine case.
IV. ABSTRACTION SCHEME The input to our abstraction method is the infinite parameterized family F = {Inst(p, Sk(A)) | p ∈ P RC } of Kripke structures specified via a CFA A. The family F has two principal sources of unboundedness: unbounded variables in the process skeleton Sk(A), and the unbounded number of processes N (p). We deal with these two aspects separately, using two abstraction steps, namely the PIA data abstraction and the PIA counter abstraction. In both abstraction steps we use the parametric interval abstraction PIA that we introduce in Section IV-A.
A. Abstract Domain of Parametric Intervals (PIA)
Given a CFA A, let G A be the set of all linear combinations a 0 + 1≤i≤|Π| a i · p i that are met in the left-hand sides of A's threshold guards. Every expression ε of G A defines a function f ε : P RC → D. Let T = {0, 1} ∪ {f ε | ε ∈ G A } be a finite threshold set of cardinality µ + 1. For convenience, we name elements of T as ϑ 0 , ϑ 1 , . . . , ϑ µ with ϑ 0 corresponding to the constant function 0, and ϑ 1 corresponding to the constant function 1. For instance, the CFA in Figure 1 has the threshold set {ϑ 0 , ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 , ϑ 3 }, where ϑ 2 (n, t, f ) = t + 1 and ϑ 3 (n, t, f ) = n − t.
Then, we define the domain of parametric intervals:
Our abstraction rests on an implicit property of many faulttolerant distributed algorithms, namely, that the resilience condition RC induces an order on the thresholds used in the algorithm (e.g., t + 1 < n − t). Assuming such an order does not limit the application of our approach: In cases where only a partial order is induced by RC, one can simply enumerate all finitely many total orders. As parameters, and thus thresholds, are kept unchanged in a run, one can verify an algorithm for each threshold order separately, and then combine the results. We may thus restrict the threshold sets we consider by:
Definition 8: The finite set T is uniformly ordered if for all p ∈ P RC , and all ϑ j (p) and ϑ k (p) in T with 0 ≤ j < k ≤ µ, it holds that ϑ j (p) < ϑ k (p).
Definition 8 allows us to properly define the parameterized abstraction function
From ϑ 0 (p) = 0 and ϑ 1 (p) = 1, it immediately follows that for all p ∈ P RC , we have α p (0) = I 0 , α p (1) = I 1 , and γ p (I 0 ) = {0}. Moreover, from the definitions of α, γ, and Definition 8 one immediately obtains:
Proposition 9: For all p in P RC , and for all a in D, it holds that a ∈ γ p (α p (a)).
Definition 10:
The PIA domain has similarities to predicate abstraction since the interval borders are naturally expressed as predicates, and computations over PIA are directly reduced to SMT solvers. However, notions such as the order of Definition 10 are not naturally expressed in terms of predicate abstraction.
B. PIA data abstraction
Our parameterized data abstraction is based on two abstraction ideas. First, the variables used in a process skeleton are unbounded and we have to map those unbounded variables to a fixed-size domain. If we fix parameters p ∈ P RC , then an interval abstraction [18] is a natural solution to the problem of unboundedness. Second, we want to produce a single process skeleton that does not depend on parameters p ∈ P RC and captures the behavior of all process instances. This can be done by using ideas from existential abstraction [17] , [20] , [37] and sound abstraction of fairness constraints [37] . Our contribution consists of combining these two ideas to arrive at parametric interval data abstraction.
Our abstraction maps values of unbounded variables to parametric intervals I j , whose boundaries are symbolic expressions over parameters. This abstraction differs from interval abstraction [18] in that the interval bounds are not numeric. However, for every instance, the boundaries are constant because the parameters are fixed. We hence do not have to deal with symbolic ranges over variables in the sense of [46] .
We now discuss an existential abstraction of a formula Φ that is either a threshold or a comparison guard (we consider other guards later). To this end we introduce notation for sets of vectors satisfying Φ. According to Section III-A, formula Φ has two kinds of free variables: parameter variables from Π and data variables from Λ ∪ Γ. Let x p be a vector of parameter variables (x p 1 , . . . , x p |Π| ) and x v be a vector
we denote that Φ is satisfied on concrete values
and parameter values p. We define:
Hence, ||Φ|| E contains all vectors of abstract values that correspond to some concrete values satisfying Φ. Note carefully, that parameters do not appear anymore due to existential quantification. A PIA existential abstraction of Φ is defined to be a formulaΦ over a vector of variablesx =x 1 , . . . ,
Computing PIA abstractions. The central property of our abstract domain is that it allows to abstract comparisons against thresholds (i.e., threshold guards) in a precise way. That is, we can abstract formulas of the form ϑ j (p) ≤ x 1 by I j ≤x 1 and ϑ j (p) > x 1 by I j >x 1 . In fact, this abstraction is precise in the following sense.
Proposition 11: For all p ∈ P RC and all a ∈ D:
For all comparison guards we are going to use a general form (well-known from the literature), namely:
If the domain D is small (as it is in our case), then one can enumerate all vectors of abstract values in D k and check which belong to our abstraction ||Φ|| E , using an SMT solver.
Transforming CFA. We now describe a general method to abstract guard formulas, and thus construct an abstract process skeleton. To this end, we denote by α E a mapping from a concrete formula Φ to some existential abstraction of Φ (not necessarily constructed as above). By fixing α E , we can define an abstraction of a guard of a CFA:
By slightly abusing the notation, for a CFA A by abst(A) we denote the CFA that is obtained from A by replacing every guard g with abst(g). Note that abst(A) contains only guards over sv and over abstract variables over D.
Definition 13: We define a mapping h 
Theorem 16: For all p ∈ P RC , and for all CFA A, if system instance Inst(p, Sk(A)) = (S I , S 0 I , R I , AP, λ I ) and system instance Inst(p, Sk abs (A)) = (SÎ , S
Theorem 16 is the first step to prove simulation. In order to actually do so, we now define the labeling function λÎ . For propositions from p ∈ AP SV , λÎ (σ) is defined in the same way as λ I . Similarly to [37] for propositions from p ∈ AP D , which are used in justice constraints, we define:
From Theorem 16, the definition ofh dat p with respect to the variable sv, and the definition of λÎ , one immediately obtains the following theorems. Theorem 18 ensures that justice constraints J in the abstract system Inst(p, Sk abs (A)) are a sound abstraction of justice constraints J in Inst(p, Sk(A)).
Theorem 17: For all p ∈ P RC , and for all CFA A, it holds Inst(p, Sk(A)) Inst(p, Sk abs (A)), with respect to AP SV .
Theorem 18: Let π = {σ i } i≥1 be a J-fair path of Inst(p, Sk(A)). Thenπ = {h dat p (σ i )} i≥1 is a J-fair path of Inst(p, Sk abs (A)).
C. PIA counter abstraction
In this section, we present a counter abstraction inspired by [45] which maps a system instance composed of identical finite state process skeletons to a single finite state system. We use the PIA domain D along with abstractions α E ({x ′ = x + 1}) and α E ({x ′ = x − 1}) for the counters. Let us consider a process skeleton Sk = (S, S 0 , R), where S = SV ×D |Λ| ×D |Γ| ×D |Π| that is defined using an arbitrary finite domainD. (Note that we do not require that the skeleton is obtained from a CFA.) Our counter abstraction over the abstract domain D proceeds in two stages, where the first stage is only a change in representation, but not an abstraction.
Stage 1: Vector Addition System with States (VASS).
Let L = {ℓ ∈ SV ×D |Λ| | ∃s ∈ S. ℓ = {sv}∪Λ s} be the set of local states of a process skeleton. As the domainD and the set of local variables Λ are finite, L is finite. We write the elements of L as ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ |L| . We define the counting function K : S I × L → D such that K(σ, ℓ) is the number of processes i whose local state is ℓ in global state σ, i.e., σ[i] = {sv}∪Λ ℓ. Thus, we represent the system state σ ∈ S I as a tuple (g 1 , . . . , g k , K[σ, ℓ 1 ], . . . , K[σ, ℓ |L| ]), i.e., by the shared global state and by the counters for the local states. If a process moves from local state ℓ i to local state ℓ j , the counters of ℓ i and ℓ j will decrement and increment, respectively.
Stage 2: Abstraction of VASS. We abstract the counters K of the VASS representation using the PIA domain to obtain a finite state Kripke structure C(Sk). To compute C(Sk) = (S C , S 0 C , R C , AP, λ C ) we proceed as follows: A state w ∈ S C is given by values of shared variables from the set Γ, ranging overD |Γ| , and by a vector
From the definition, one can see how to construct the initial states. Informally, we require (1) that the initial shared states of C(Sk) correspond to initial shared states of Sk, (2) that there are actually N (p) processes in the system, and (3) that initially all processes are in an initial state.
The intuition 4 for the construction of the transition relation is as follows: Like in VASS, a step that brings a process from local state ℓ i to ℓ j can be modeled by decrementing the (nonzero) counter of ℓ i and incrementing the counter of ℓ j . Like Pnueli, Xu, and Zuck [45] we use the idea of representing counters in an abstract domain, and performing increment and decrement using existential abstraction. They used a threevalued domain representing 0, 1, or more processes. As we are interested, e.g., in the fact whether at least t + 1 or n − t processes are in a certain state, the domain from [45] is too coarse for us. Therefore, we use counters from D, and we increment and decrement counters using the formulas α E ({x ′ = x + 1}) and α E ({x ′ = x − 1}). Theorem 20: For all p ∈ P RC , and all finite state process skeletons Sk, let system instance Inst(p, Sk) = (S I , S 0 I , R I , AP, λ I ), and [∀i. Φ(i)] ∈ λ C (w) if and only if 
Corollary 23 (Soundness of data & counter abstraction):
For all CFA A, and for all formulas ϕ from LTL -X over AP SV and justice constraints J ⊆ AP D : if C(Sk abs (A)) |= J ϕ, then for all p ∈ P RC it holds Inst(p, Sk(A)) |= J ϕ.
V. ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT
Due to our parametric existential abstraction of comparison guards, which may be imprecise, we have to deal with several kinds of spurious behavior.
The first one is caused by spurious transitions. Consider a transition τ of C(Sk abs (A)). We say that the transition τ is spurious w.r.t. p ∈ P RC , if there is no transition in Inst(p, Sk(A)) that is a concretization of τ . This situation can be detected by known techniques [14] for a fixed p. However, it is not sound to remove τ from C(Sk abs (A)), unless τ is spurious w.r.t. all p ∈ P RC . We call transitions that are spurious w.r.t. all admissible parameters uniformly spurious. Detecting such transitions is a challenge and to the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been investigated before. To detect such transitions, we use one more intermediate abstraction in the form of VASS that abstracts local variables as in Section IV-B and keeps concrete shared variables and process counters.
Independently of uniformly spurious transitions, parametric abstraction leads to the second interesting problem. Consider transitions τ 1 and τ 2 of C(Sk abs (A)) that are not spurious w.r.t. p 1 and p 2 in P RC , respectively, for p 1 = p 2 . It can be the case that a path τ 1 , τ 2 is in C(Sk abs (A)) and there is no p 3 ∈ P RC such that the concretization of τ 1 , τ 2 is a path in Inst(p 3 , Sk(A)), i.e., the path τ 1 , τ 2 is uniformly spurious. We detect such spurious behavior by invariants. These invariants are provided by the user as invariant candidates, and then automatically checked to actually be invariant using an SMT solver.
As observed by [45] , counter abstraction may lead to justice suppression. Given a counter-example in the form of a lasso, we detect whether its loop contains only unjust states. If this is the case, we refine C(Sk abs (A)) by adding a justice requirement, which is consistent with existing requirements in all concrete instances Inst(p, Sk(A)). This refinement is similar to an idea from [45] .
Below, we give a general framework for a sound refinement of C(Sk abs (A)).
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To simplify presentation, we define a monster system as a (possibly infinite) Kripke structure Sys ω = (S ω , S 0 ω , R ω , AP, λ ω ), whose state space and transition relation are disjoint unions of state spaces and transition relations of system instances Inst(p, Sk(A)) = (S p , S 0 p , R p , AP, λ p ) over all admissible parameters:
Using abstraction mappingsh dat p andh cnt p we define an abstraction mappingh dc : S ω → S C from Sys ω to C(Sk abs (A)): While for finite state systems there are methods to detect whether a path is spurious [14] , we are not aware of a method to detect whether a pathT in C(Sk abs (A)) corresponds to a path in the (concrete) infinite monster system Sys ω . Therefore, we limit ourselves to detecting and refining uniformly spurious transitions and unjust states.
Definition 26: An abstract transition (w, w ′ ) ∈ R C is uniformly spurious iff there is no transition (σ, σ ′ ) ∈ R ω with w =h dc (σ) and w ′ =h dc (σ ′ ). Definition 27: An abstract state w ∈ S C is unjust under q ∈ AP D iff there is no concrete state σ ∈ S ω with w =h dc (σ) and q ∈ λ ω (σ).
We give a general criterion that ensures soundness of abstraction, when removing uniformly spurious transitions. In other words, removing a transition does not affect the property of transition preservation.
Theorem 28: Let T ⊆ R C be a set of spurious transitions. Then for every transition (σ, ω . For such a counterexampleT we denote the set of states in the lasso's loop by U . We then check, whether all states of U are unjust under some justice constraint q ∈ J. If this is the case,T is a spurious counterexample, because the justice constraint q is violated. Note that it is sound to only consider infinite paths, where states outside of U appear infinitely often; in fact, this is a justice requirement. To refine C's unjust behavior we add a corresponding justice requirement. Formally, we augment J (and AP D ) with a propositional symbol [off U ]. Further, we augment the labelling function λ C such that every w ∈ S C is labelled with [off U ] if and only if w ∈ U .
Theorem 29: Let J ⊆ AP D be a set of justice requirements, q ∈ J, and U ⊆ S C be a set of unjust states under q. Let [29] . CHECKED UNDER DIFFERENT RESILIENCE CONDITIONS (RC):
π = {σ i } i≥1 be an arbitrary fair path of Sys ω under J. The pathπ = {h dc (σ i )} i≥1 is a fair path in C(Sk abs (A)) under
From this we derive that loops containing only unjust states can be eliminated, and thus C(Sk abs (A)) be refined.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To show practicability of the abstraction, we have implemented the PIA abstractions and the refinement loop in OCaml as a prototype tool BYMC. We evaluated it on the algorithms and the specifications discussed in Section III-C, and conducted experiments that are summarized in Table I .
We extended the PROMELA language [34] with constructs to express Π, AP, RC, and N . BYMC receives a description of a CFA A in this extended PROMELA, and then syntactically extracts the thresholds. The tool chain uses the Yices SMT solver for existential abstraction, and generates the counter abstraction C(Sk abs (A)) in standard Promela, such that we can use Spin to do finite state model checking. Finally, BYMC also implements the refinements introduced in Section V and refines the Promela code for C(Sk abs (A)) by introducing predicates capturing spurious transitions and unjust states.
The column "#R" gives the numbers of refinement steps. In the cases where it is greater than zero, refinement was necessary, and "Spin Time" refers to the SPIN running time after the last refinement step.
In the cases (A) we used resilience conditions as provided by the literature, and verified the specification. The model RBC represents the reliable broadcast algorithm also considered in [29] .
In the bottom part of Table I we used different resilience conditions under which we expected the algorithms to fail. The cases (B) capture the case where more faults occur than expected by the algorithm designer, while the cases (C) and (D) capture the cases where the algorithms were designed by assuming wrong resilience conditions. We omit (CLEAN) as the only sensible case n = t = f (all processes are faulty) results into a trivial abstract domain of one interval [0, ∞).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a novel technique to model check faulttolerant distributed algorithms. To this end, we extended the standard setting of parameterized model checking to processes which use threshold guards, and are parameterized with a resilience condition. As a case study we have chosen the core of several broadcasting algorithms under different failure models, including the one by Srikanth and Toueg [49] that tolerates Byzantine faults. These algorithms are widely applied in the literature: typically, multiple (possibly an unbounded number of) instances are used in combination. As future work, we plan to use compositional model checking techniques [44] for parameterized verification of such algorithms.
APPENDIX A UNDECIDABILITY OF LIVENESS PROPERTIES
In this section we show that the non-halting problem of a two counter machine (2CM) is reducible to the parameterized model checking problem as defined above, that is, using a parameter n, a CFA A to construct an instance Inst(n + 1, Sk(A)), an LTL -X formula that uses G , F , and atomic propositions [∃i. sv i = Z]. We show that Inst(n + 1, Sk(A)) simulates at least n steps of the 2CM, and that therefore the general parameterized model checking problem as formulated in Section II is undecideable. Note that G , F , and [∃i. sv i = Z] are required to express the liveness property (R) of our FTDA.
The CFA A contains the functionalities of a control process that simulates the program of the 2CM, as well as of data processes that each store at most one digit of one of the two counters B and C encoded in unary representation. For simplicity of presentation, we say that if a data process does not store a digit for B or C, then it stores a digit for a counter D. Counter D thus serves as a capacity (initially set to n), from which B and C can borrow (and return) digits, that is, initially all data processes' status variable corresponds to D. Our CFA A uses only the status variable sv, while the sets of local and global variables can be empty. We consider paths where exactly one process plays the role of the control process, and the remaining n processes are data processes. This can be encoded using G , F , and [∃i.
Intuitively, whenever the control process has to increase or decrease the value of a counter, this is done by a handshake of the control with a data process; up to this point, our proof follows ideas from [31] , [26] , [27] . In contrast to these papers, however, our system model does not provide primitives for such a handshake, which leads to the central contribution for our proof: we "move" this handshake into the specification without using the "next time" operator not present in LTL -X . In addition, as in [27] , also the test for zero is moved into the specification using our propositions ¬[∃i. sv i = Z]. We start with some preliminary definitions.
A two counter machine (2CM) M is a list of m + 1 statements over two counters B and C. A statement at location v uses a counter C(v) ∈ {B, C} and has one of the following forms (note, that the machine halts at location m):
The control flow of the machine M is defined by the labelled graph (V, E, C), where V = {v | 0 ≤ v ≤ m} is the set of locations, E = E + ∪ E 0 ∪ E − ∪ {m, m} is the set of edges, and C : V → {B, C} is the labelling function which maps a location to the counter used in this location. The sets E + , E 0 , E − are defined as follows: Fig. 3 . CFA J(v, w) for (v, w) ∈ E + and I(x, y) for inc y (and dec x).
• E 0 = {(v, w ′ ) | statement at v goes to w ′ as in (2)};
In what follows, we model a handshake between the control process and a data process in order to implement an increment as in (1) or decrement as in (3) . The handshake is guaranteed by a combination of steps both in the control and the data processes and by a constraint formulated in LTL -X as follows.
We define the set SV C of status values of the control process and the set SV D be the set of status values of a data process:
For each (f, t, h) ∈ SV C ∪ SV D , f is the state before a handshake, t is the scheduled state after a handshake, and h is the status of the handshake.
Consider an edge (v, w) ∈ E + and x = D and y = C(v), that is, in location v the counter C(v) is incremented, and then the control goes to location w. Incrementing the counter is done by a handshake during which the control process goes from v to w, while a data process goes from D (the capacity) to C(v).
To do so, we construct two CFAs J(v, w) and I(x, y) shown in Figure 3 : J(v, w) goes from location v of M to location w in three steps SynC → AckC → IdlC , whereas I(x, y) transfers one digit from counter x to counter y in steps SynD → AckD → IdlD . To actually enforce the handshake synchronization, we add the following formula HS (v, w, x, y) that must hold in every state of a system instance:
In what follows, we will consider the union of CFAs, where union is defined naturally as the union of the sets of nodes and the union of the sets of edges (note that the CFAs are joint at the initial node q I , and the final node q F ).
We are now ready to prove the central result: Let M be a system of K processes Inst(K, Sk(J(v, w) ∪ I(x, y))) and σ 0 be a global state of M such that
The constraints (5)- (8) impose a synchronization behavior:
Proposition 30: Let π be an infinite path {σ i } i≥1 of M starting with σ 1 . If π |= G HS (v, w, x, y) , then there exists an index ℓ such that 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ K and σ 7 [1] .sv = (w, w, IdlC )
Proof: We consider all states in the prefix σ 1 , . . . σ 7 . To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that the prefix σ 1 , . . . σ 7 is as follows for some process ℓ such that 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ K:
Now we show that other possible executions contradict to the lemma's hypothesis. Recall that a single step of a process corresponds to a path of its CFA from q I to q F .
State σ 1 . By the hypothesis of the lemma.
State σ 2 . As data processes are blocked in σ 1 by (5), only process 1 can move.
State σ 3 . Suppose by contradiction that process 1 makes a step in σ 2 . Then σ
In such a σ ′ 3 , process 1 is blocked by (8) , and the other processes are blocked by (5) . It follows that no process can make a further step, and π cannot be infinite, which provides the required contradiction. Hence, there is some data process ℓ which makes the step.
State σ 4 . In σ 3 process ℓ is blocked by (7) . Further, suppose by contradiction that data process k = ℓ makes a step resulting in σ , all data processes move from (x, x, IdlD ) to (x, y, SynD ). As we have finitely many processes, eventually all data processes will stop at (x, y, SynD). In this state, every process will be blocked by (5) and (6) . This contradicts the assumption that π is infinite.
State σ 5 . In σ 4 every process k > 1 different from ℓ is blocked by the same argument as in state σ 3 (they all eventually group and are blocked in (x, y, SynD )). Process 1 cannot move due to (8) .
State σ 6 . In σ 5 process 1 cannot move by (8) . As process 1 resides in (v, w, AckC ) -and thus not in (v, w, SynC ) -by (5), every data process k > 1 different from ℓ is blocked. State σ 7 . In σ 6 , every data process k > 1 different from ℓ is blocked due to (5), as process 1 resides at (v, w, AckC ). Process ℓ cannot move because 6 its CFA contains no guard sv = (y, y, IdlD).
Using J(v, w) and I(x, y) we can simulate (1) for (v, w) ∈ E + by instantiating J(v, w) and I (D, C(v) ). Moreover, we can simulate (3) for (v, w ′′ ) ∈ E − by instantiating J(v, w ′′ ) and I (C(v), D) . Finally, we can simulate (2) for (v, w ′ ) ∈ E 0 (that is, the test for zero) by instantiating J(v, w ′ ) and adding one more temporal constraint EQ 0 (v, w ′ ):
Now we can construct the CFA A(M) that simulates M. This CFA is a union of CFAs constructed for edges of E. If
Further we define a specification which ensures that there is always exactly one control process, CP , as
We specify the non-halting property ϕ nonhalt as follows:
We can specify two initial process states: One is where the process stays in sv C = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 0 , IdlC ); Another one is where the process
Theorem 6. Let M be a two counter machine, and (RC, N ) be a natural pair of resilience condition and system size function. One can efficiently construct a non-communicating CFA A(M) and an LTL -X property ϕ nonhalt (M) such that the following two statements are equivalent:
APPENDIX B CFAS OF FTDA
In this section we give examples of the CFAs we use for our experiments in Figure 4 and 5. They have been formalized as discussed in [36] . In the body of the current paper, we use
sv := SE sv := AC Fig. 4 . Example CFA of a FTDA as formalized in [36] .
slightly different CFA definitions, namely without increments, assignments, and non-deterministic choice from a range of values.
Using the algorithm from [19] , the CFA in Figure 1 is obtained from the CFA in Figure 4 : In contrast to the original CFA from Figure 4 , for the CFA in Figure 1 in every path from q I to q F , each variable appears at most once in the lefthand side for every assignment in the original CFA. Every variable x has several copies: x for the initial value, x ′ for the final one, and x 1 , x 2 , . . . for intermediate ones.
APPENDIX C DETAILS OF THE COUNTER ABSTRACTION
1) Initial states.: Let L 0 be a set {ℓ | ℓ ∈ L ∧ ∃s 0 ∈ S 0 . ℓ = {sv}∪Λ s 0 }; it captures initial local states. Then w 0 ∈ S 0 C if and only the following conditions are met:
Less formally: Concrete counter values are mapped to w 0 .κ[ℓ i ] using α p ; We consider only combinations of counters that give a system size N (p); Every counter κ[ℓ i ] is initialized to zero, if the local state ℓ i is met in no initial state s 0 ∈ S 0 ; a shared variable g of w 0 may be initialized to a value v only if there is some initial state s 0 ∈ S 0 with s 0 .g = v.
2) Transition relation.: We now formalize the transition relation R C of C(Sk). The formal definition of when for two states w and w ′ of the counter abstraction it holds that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R C is given below in (9) to (18) . We will discuss each of these formulas separately. We start from the transition relation R of the process skeleton Sk from which we abstract. Recall that (s, s ′ ) ∈ R means that a process can go from s to s ′ . From (10) and (13) we get that, FROM is the local state of s, and TO is the local state of s ′ . In the abstraction, if FROM = TO, a step from s to s ′ is represented by increasing the counter at index TO by 1 and decreasing the one at FROM by 1. Otherwise, that is, if FROM = TO, the counter of FROM should not change. Here "increase" and "decrease" is performed using the corresponding functions over the abstract domain D, and the mentioned updates of the counters are enforced in (16) , (17), and (15) . Further, the counters of all local states different from FROM and TO should not change, which we achieved by (18) . Performing such a transition should only be possible if there is actually a process in state s, which means in the abstraction that the corresponding counter is greater than I 0 . We enforce this restriction by (12) .
By the above, we abstract the transition with respect to local states. However, s and s ′ also contain the shared variables. We have to make sure that the shared variables are updated in the abstraction in the same way they are updated in the concrete system, which is achieved in (11) and (14) .
We thus arrive at the formal definition of the abstract transition relation: R C consists of all pairs (w, w ′ ) for which there exist s and s ′ in S, and FROM and TO in L such that equations (9)-(18) hold:
APPENDIX D DETAILED PROOFS
Simulation. In order to compare the behavior of system instances we use the notion of simulation. Given two Kripke structures relation with respect to a set of atomic propositions AP ′ ⊆ AP iff for every pair of states (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ H the following conditions hold:
• for every state t 1 , with (s 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R 1 , there is a state t 2 with the property (s 2 , t 2 ) ∈ R 2 and (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ H. If there is a simulation relation H on M 1 and M 2 such that, for every initial state s x ∈ Π ∪ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv} it holds h it also holds in stateh Fix an arbitrary justice constraint q ∈ J ⊆ AP D ; infinitely many states on π are labelled with q. Fix an arbitrary state σ on π such that q ∈ λ I . We show that q ∈ λ C (h [∃i.
Consider two cases: Existential case (23) . There is a process index i :
As i is the index of a process with ℓ = Lσ [i], it immediately follows that K(w, ℓ) = 0. From the definition of α it follows that for every p ∈ P RC it holds α p (K(w, ℓ)) = I 0 . Thus, by the definition ofh Hence, both requirements of equation (23) are met for ℓ and from the property of disjunction we have q ∈ λ C (w). Universal case (24) . Then for every process index i :
By fixing an arbitrary i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N (p), choosing ℓ ∈ L with ℓ = L w and by repeating exactly the same argument as in the existential case, we show that
It immediately follows that K(w, ℓ ′ ) = 0; from the definition of α p we have that α p (K(w, ℓ ′ )) = I 0 and thus κ[ℓ ′ ] = I 0 . Then for ℓ ′ the disjunct in 24 holds true as well.
Thus, we conclude that the conjunction in the right-hand side of the equation (24) holds, which immediately results in q ∈ λ C (w).
From Universal case and Existential Case we conclude that q ∈ λ C (w). As we choseσ to be an arbitrary state on π labelled with q and we know that there are infinitely many such states on π, we have shown that there are infinitely many statesh cnt p (σ) onπ labelled with q. Finally, as q was chosen to be an arbitrary justice constraint from J, we conclude that every justice constraint q ∈ J appears infinitely often onπ.
This proves thatπ is a fair path.
Theorem 28. Let T ⊆ R C be a set of spurious transitions. Then for every transition
, and (w, w ′ ) ∈ R C ∩ T . As T is a set of uniformly spurious transitions, we have that the transition (w, w ′ ) is uniformly spurious. Consider a pair of states ρ, ρ ′ ∈ S ω with the propertyh dc (ρ) = w andh dc (ρ ′ ) = w ′ . From Definition 26 it follows that (ρ, ρ ′ ) ∈ R ω . This contradicts the assumption (σ, σ ′ ) ∈ R ω as we can take ρ = σ and ρ ′ = σ ′ . Using the suffix suf (π) we reconstruct a corresponding suffix suf (π) of π (by skipping the prefix of the same length as inπ). From the fact that every state of suf (π) is unjust under q we know that every state σ ∈ suf (π) violates the constraint q as well, namely, q ∈ λ ω (σ). Thus, π has at most finitely many states labelled with q ∈ J. It immediately follows from the definition of fairness that π is not fair under J. This contradicts the assumption of the theorem.
APPENDIX E SOUND REFINEMENT TECHNIQUES
A. Detecting Spurious Transitions and Unjust States
In this section we show symbolic techniques to detect spurious transitions and unfair states for our specific PIA abstractions. We are concerned with symbolic representations that can be encoded as a formula of an SMT solver. While there are systems where one can encode the monster system Sys ω (Section V) in an SMT solver [37] , [45] , it is not obvious how to do this for threshold-based distributed algorithms, which have a parameterized local state space.
Our method consists of using a model for refinement that abstracts only local state space, but is finer than {Inst(p, Sk abs (A))} p∈PRC . Thus, we introduce a family {Inst(p, Sk Λ (A))} p∈PRC , where Sk Λ (A) is a skeleton obtained by applying a data abstraction similar to Section IV-B, but shared variables Γ preserve their concrete values. Because guards operate on variables both in the abstract and concrete domain, we have to define a finer abstraction of guards.
We need some additional notation. In Section IV-A we introduced set G A of linear combinations met in threshold guards of CFA A. Let ε i be such an expression that induces the threshold function ϑ j for 0 ≤ j ≤ µ. Note, that ε 0 stands for 0 and ε 1 stands for 1. We construct a formula in(y, I a ) expressing that a variable y lies within the interval captured by I a . (Note that parameter variables are free in the formula.) in(y, I a ) ≡ (I a = I µ ∧ ε a ≤ y) ∨ (I a = I µ ∧ ε a ≤ y < ε a+1 )
The abstraction of CFA guards is defined in Figure 6 . Similarly to Section IV-B we construct a CFA abst Λ (A) and then use a process skeleton Sk Λ (A) induced by abst Λ (A). For every parameter values p ∈ P RC one can construct an instance Inst(p, Sk Λ (A)) using Sk Λ (A). We are going to show that this abstraction is coarser than Inst(p, Sk(A)) and finer than Inst(p, Sk abs (A)) due to:
Proposition 31: Sk(A) Sk Λ (A) Sk abs (A). Now we encode the whole family {Inst(p, Sk Λ (A))} p∈PRC using the VASS representation introduced in Section IV-C. A global state of the system VS Λ is represented by a vector of parameter values, a vector of shared variable values, and a vector of process counters: (p, g, K), where p ∈ P RC , g ∈ D |Γ| , K ∈ N |L| 0 . Moreover, N (p) = 1≤i≤|L| K i . One can define a formula Init(p, g, K) that captures the initial states (p, g, K) similarly to the initial states of C(Sk abs (A)).
VS Λ makes a step from a global state (p, g, K) to a global state (p ′ , g ′ , K ′ ) when:
• p ′ = p;
• there is a step (s, s ′ ) ∈ R of the skeleton Sk Λ (A), where a process moves from the local state FROM = Λ s to the local state TO = Λ s ′ ;
• at least one process stays in FROM, i.e. K FROM > 0;
• the counters are updated as K • other counters do not change values, i.e. ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|. (i = FROM ∧ i = TO) → K ′ i = K i . We can encode these constraints by a symbolic formula
Step(p, g, K, p ′ , g ′ , K ′ ). The function λ VSΛ labels states with justice constraints similar to the equations that define λ C in Section IV-C. We omit the formal definition here.
Proposition 32: System VS Λ simulates system Sys ω . This allows us to use the following strategy. We take a transition τ of C(Sk abs (A)) and try to replay it in VS Λ . If τ is not reproducible in VS Λ , due to Proposition 28, τ is a spurious transition in Sys ω and it can be removed. The following proposition provides us with a condition to check if τ can be replayed in VS Λ :
Proposition 33: Let (w, w ′ ) ∈ R C be a transition of C(Sk abs (A)). If there exists a transition (σ, σ ′ ) ∈ R ω such that w =h dc (σ) and w ′ =h dc (σ ′ ), then there exists a transition Step(p, g, K, p, g ′ , K ′ ) of VS Λ satisfying the following condition:
In other words, if the formula from Proposition 34 is unsatisfiable, the transition (w, w ′ ) can be removed safely. Further, we check whether an abstract state w ∈ S C is an unjust one. If it is, then Proposition 33 allows us to refine justice constraints. The following proposition provides us with a condition that a state is unjust in VS Λ :
Proposition 34: Let w ∈ S C be a state of C(Sk abs (A)) and q ∈ AP D be a proposition expressing a justice constraint. If there exists a state σ ∈ S ω such that w =h dc (σ) and q ∈ λ ω (σ), then there exists a state (p, g, K) of VS Λ satisfying the following condition:
In other words, if the formula from Proposition 34 is unsatisfiable, there is no state σ ∈ S ω with q ∈ λ ω (σ) abstracted to w. Thus, w is unjust.
Remark 35: The system VS Λ and the constraints of Propositions 33 and 34 can be encoded in an SMT solver. By checking satisfiability we detect spurious transitions and unjust states. Moreover, unsatisfiable cores allow us to prune several spurious transitions and unjust states at once.
B. Invariant Candidates Provided by the User
In the transition-based approach of the previous section we cannot detect paths of being spurious in the case they do not contain uniformly spurious transitions (cf. beginning of Section V). In this case a human guidance might help: An expert gives an invariant candidate. Assuming the invariant
if g is a threshold guard (Ia,I b )∈||g||Ex = I a ∧ in(y, I b ) if g is a comparison guard over x ∈ Λ, y ∈ Γ g if g is either a comparison guard over x, y ∈ Γ or a status guard abst Λ (g 1 ) ∧ abst Λ (g 2 ) if g is g 1 ∧ g 2 candidate is expressed as a formula Inv over a global state (p, g, K) of VS Λ , the invariant candidate can be automatically proven to indeed being an invariant by verifying satisfiability of the formulas:
Inv(p, g, K) ∧ Step(p, g, K, p, g
Then a transition (w, w ′ ) ∈ R C is spurious if the following formula is not satisfiable:
Step(p, g, K, p, g
If we receive a counterexampleT that cannot be refined with the techniques from the previous section, we test each transition ofT against the above formula. If the formula is unsatisfiable for a transition (w, w ′ ) ∈T , it is sound to remove it from C(Sk abs (A)) due to Theorem 28, Equations (25) , (26) , and the formula above.
Example 36: To give an impression, how simple an invariant can be, for our case study (cf. Section II) the relay specification required us to introduce the following invariant candidate: If L s = {ℓ ∈ L | ℓ.sv = SE ∨ ℓ.sv = AC}, then the following formula is an invariant nsnt = ℓ∈Ls K ℓ . Intuitively, it captures the obvious property that the number of messages sent is equal to the number of processes that have sent a message. This property was, however, lost in the course of abstraction.
